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Abstract I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems
by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative
risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this
market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other
banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react
strategically to the central bank’s presence due to its low externalities, there
is a risk that it backfires, with these other banks’ taking more risky positions
than if the central bank were not there. The proper role of the central bank
may actually be to stay out.
Keywords Payments · Risk externalities · Interbank market ·
Mixed oligopoly · Central bank
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the US Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System have announced a new policy on payment system
risk, in which the central bank will be playing a greater role than it did before.1
In this paper, I argue, however, that there are good reasons to be cautious
about the central bank’s role in the market for payments.
1See Board of Governors of the Federal System (2008) for details on the new policy, which will
take effect late 2010 or early 2011.
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Banks operating in the payments market exert negative risk externalities on
each other. A role for the central bank to play in this market could be as a
balancing of two concerns that these externalities raise: On one hand, a central
bank never gets illiquid and therefore exerts less negative externalities than
what other banks in the market do; this calls for a large role of the central bank
in the payment system. On the other hand, negative externalities imply that
the equilibrium quantity supplied in the market is too high relative to social
optimum. But the presence of a central bank, with its benign externalities, will
cause the other banks to increase their activities. As my analysis below will
show, this strategic response by the other banks to the presence of the central
bank may call for a reduction in the central bank’s activities—despite it being
more efficient than the others—and perhaps even a total abstention.
In order to model this trade-off, I propose a stylized model of the market
for payments as an oligopoly facing a downward-sloping demand; thus, the
number of payments carried out in the economy will depend on the price
charged for the payment service. Although there, in general, is undersupply in
the equilibrium of an oligopoly, compared to the social optimum, this outcome
may not hold true when the oligopolists’ activities exert negative externalities.2
In Section 2 of this paper, I briefly present the payments system and the
externalities involved. In the payments industry, a payment may involve one
bank (the payee’s bank) extending intra-day credit to another bank (the
payer’s bank) until the payment is settled. One bank’s provision of services
thus exerts negative risk externalities on other banks. There are two kinds of
risk externalities involved. First, when one bank extends credit to another
bank, the first bank does not take into account, in its assessment of this
business, how extending this credit affects the other bank’s ability to honor its
debt to third-parties; this is a credit-risk externality. Secondly, and importantly,
the first bank does not take into account the effect a failure by the other bank in
honoring the debt may affect its own ability to honor its debt to third-parties;
this is a systemic-risk externality. The Section ends with a brief overview of
related literature.
In Section 3, I present my model of banks participating in this payments
system and, in so doing, interacting strategically and exerting negative risk
externalities upon each other. In the model, the demand for payment services
is price sensitive, as discussed above. Moreover, the central bank is modelled
as differing from the other banks on two counts. First, it is publicly owned and
is therefore maximizing welfare. Secondly, since the central bank itself cannot
become illiquid, it does not exert any systemic-risk externality.
In Section 4, I present three different scenarios: one in which all banks are
private and profit-maximizing; one in which one of the banks is a publicly
2One commonly discussed case is that of pollution. The observation that a monopolist exerting
negative externalities does not necessarily produce less than what is socially optimal dates back at
least to Buchanan (1969). Among law scholars, there has been a discussion on the proper antitrust
policy in industries with negative externalities from production or consumption; see, e.g., Leslie
(1993), Hammer (2000), and Crane (2005).
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owned bank with the aim of maximizing welfare; and one in which the publicly
owned bank in addition also is the central bank. Since the central bank cannot
possibly become illiquid, the risk externalities associated with its activities are
different from those of the other banks.
In Section 5, I find the socially optimum outcome in this market, account
taken, by a social planner, of all externalities.
In Section 6, I analyze and compare the equilibrium outcomes in the various
scenarios outlined in Section 4. In particular, the central bank may have to
trade off the more moderate risk externalities it exerts itself with a too high
credit level from the private part of the market. Thus, even if the first best calls
for the central bank to be the largest, it may well end up the smallest bank in
equilibrium. In this Section, I also compare the equilibrium outcomes and the
social optima in the various scenarios. Interestingly, introducing the central
bank, thus reducing overall risk externalities in this market, may actually
increase the scope for an oversupply of credit in equilibrium, because the
private banks get much more aggressive in their extension of intra-day credit
when their public counterpart is a benign central bank than when it is just an
ordinary bank, albeit a welfare-maximizing one.
Section 7 contains concluding remarks, while the Appendix contains more
detailed results than what is in the main text, as well as proofs.
2 Externalities in the payments system
Payments flow among the banks in a modern economy. Of particular interest
here are large-value transfers; in 2008, according to reports from BIS, payments
through the two large-value transfer systems in the US totalled $1,263 trillion.3
There are essentially two kinds of large-value payments system in use: Real
Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and Deferred Net Settlement (DNS). In a
DNS system, most payments are based on a credit extended temporarily, and
often implicitly, among the banks until the payment is settled later in the day.
Thus, these payment flows necessitate a lot of intra-day (sometimes called
“daylight”) credit. In recent years, many countries have switched from a DNS
system to an RTGS system, which reduces the credit risk involved without
eliminating it: as far as possible, gross payments are settled instantly in an
RTGS system, but a lack of liquidity in a payer’s bank may make it necessary
to put off settlement also for payments in this kind of system.
Like other banking markets, the intra-day credit market may suffer from
distortions caused by the market power of individual banks. In this paper, I
present a model of an intra-day credit oligopoly with two idiosyncratic features
in addition to the market power of the banks participating. First, there are
3The two are CHIPS (the Clearing House Interbank Payments System) and Fedwire. This number,
and many others, can be extracted from Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2009).
Small-value transfers, which are the means by which the average household makes its payments,
do not give rise to intra-day credit.
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negative risk externalities among the banks: increased credit extended by one
bank increases not only its own risk but also the risk of the other banks
that are active in this market. Secondly, the central bank plays a role in this
market, a role which has to be modelled properly. In this paper, the central
bank differs from the private banks in two ways. First, the central bank is a
welfare maximizer, trying to correct as far as possible the combined distortions
created by the oligopolistic market structure and the negative risk externalities.
Secondly, the central bank, never becoming illiquid, imposes less of a negative
externality than a private bank does.
With this latter aspect of the central bank, the analysis makes an interesting
twist on the literature of mixed oligopoly (e.g., De Fraja and Delbono 1990):
In my analysis, the public firm has the double feature of being both welfare
maximizing in its objectives and comparatively efficient in its technology.
When the private-banks-only equilibrium features too much credit compared
to the first-best social optimum, because the underproduction tendency of the
oligopoly is overturned by the overproduction tendency due to the negative
risk externality, the two features of the central bank clash: With the central
bank present in the market, it seeks to correct the distortion. But should it
produce less than a private bank would, in order to correct the overproduction,
or should it produce more in light of it being more efficient? The present
analysis throws some light on these and related issues.
Berger et al. (1996) provide an account of the various risks and costs
involved in the operation of payments systems. In particular, they introduce
the risk-cost frontier of a payments system: Risks may be kept down but only
at a cost. As discussed by Berger et al., there are many kinds of risk involved in
a payment system. In the present analysis, I concentrate on contagion risk: If
one bank becomes illiquid, then inter-bank lending and the resulting financial
interdependence may cause other banks also to become illiquid.4
To be specific, consider a case of a DNS system operated by three banks,
called A, B, and C. Suppose a client of bank B wants to make a payment to
a client of bank A. If it accepts this payment to be made, bank A extends
an intra-day credit to bank B by transferring the payment immediately to
its client, even though the payment is not finalized, i.e. the amount is not
transferred from bank B to bank A until settlement time later in the day.
When bank A considers extending credit to bank B, bank A takes into
account the possibility that bank B—by this way becoming more indebted—
has an increased chance of becoming illiquid before settlement time, as well
as the credit risk this possibility imposes on it.5 This risk to bank A that the
payment will not be finalized in case the borrower defaults on its obligations
during the day is the bank’s internal direct credit risk.
4See, e.g., Kaufman (1994), Angelini et al. (1996), and Shen (1997).
5The credit risk can in a way be seen as stemming from the increased intraday debt of the
borrowing bank interacting with its overall intraday liquidity management.
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But also other lenders to the borrowing bank are affected by it getting
more indebted. In particular, when a bank extends credit to another bank, this
increases the borrowing bank’s debt and thus the probability that third banks,
who also have credit outstanding with that borrowing bank, will suffer a loss.
Bank A does not, however, take into account this risk that its credit to bank
B imposes on bank C, who also extends credit to bank B; this is the external
direct credit risk associated with bank A’s credit to bank B.
And finally, there is still another risk externality involved. The systemic risk
relates to losses incurred by third parties when a lender’s borrower defaults
and the lender then in turn defaults on its obligations. Consider again the case
where bank A extends credit to bank B. If bank B becomes illiquid, then bank
A itself may turn illiquid and bank C, extending credit to bank A as well, may
suffer a credit risk this way; this is the systemic risk associated with bank A’s
credit to bank B.
Below, I analyze the implication of the presence of these risk externalities
for the performance of the intra-day credit market, and thus of the payments
system, taking explicitly into consideration the effect of strategic interaction
among the banks.
In order to focus on these strategic effects on the functioning of a large-
value transfer system, I disregard several other important aspects of such
payment systems that are discussed elsewhere. These other aspects include:
how to design a payment system (Freixas and Parigi 1998; Kahn and Roberds
1998; Kahn et al. 2003; Fujiki et al. 2008); how to regulate the participants in a
payment system (Rochet and Tirole 1996a; Hancock and Wilcox 1996; Freixas
et al. 2000); and the scope for self-regulation through peer monitoring and the
like (Rochet and Tirole 1996b; Calomiris and Kahn 1996; Rolnick et al. 1998,
2000).
An interesting analysis of strategic interaction in a payments system is the
one by Angelini (1998) on strategic behavior in an RTGS system.6 In order
to study such a system, he develops a dynamic model and traces payments
over time during a business day. The model that I present below is designed
to focus on the role of the central bank through active participation in the
payment system. Therefore, I abstract from the dynamics that is at the heart
of Angelini’s analysis and instead present a static model of the strategic
interaction.
Strategic interaction is the focus also of Kauko’s (2009) analysis. Moreover,
like me, he discusses the role of the central bank in a mixed-oligopoly set-
ting. However, he disregards the negative risk externalities involved in the
payments system, which is central to the present concern, focusing instead
on positive network externalities. In a sense, the two analyses complement
each other by emphasizing different sets of externalities that may arise in a
payments system.
6See also Bech and Garratt (2003) for a related study.
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Closer to my concerns is the analysis of Holthausen and Rochet (2006).
Like me, they posit a downward-sloping demand for payments services and
are concerned with a case of mixed oligopoly. But there are also some
differences in the modelling approach. They discuss a situation where banks
act as consumers, seeking payment services from either a central bank or a
private payments system, whereas I have the banks—out of which one may be
the central bank—as suppliers of payment services to the public. The private
payment system is set to price at average costs, which restricts the scope for
strategic responses from private providers of payment services to the activities
of the central bank, which is at the heart of the present study.
Note, finally, that my call for the central bank to play an, at best, modest
role in the payment system is in line with views aired by such scholars as Green
and Todd (2001) and Lacker (2008), arguing essentially that the central bank’s
presence has negative moral-hazard effects on the other banks’ behaviour.
While this argument has the same flavour as mine, they do not carry out any
formal analysis in order to see how the two benign properties of a central bank,
exerting less negative externalities and maximizing welfare, interact.
3 A model of intra-day credit
My model is a highly stylized picture of what is actually going on in a payments
system. In the intra-day credit market, a bank’s demand for credit is derived
from that of the clients it serves. I assume that the number of lending banks is
exogenously fixed. To begin with, all lending banks are assumed to be private.
Later on, the issue will be what difference it makes whether one of the banks
is publicly owned, with an objective to maximize welfare, and eventually what
happens if the publicly owned bank in addition is a central bank that cannot
become illiquid (i.e., a lender of last resort).
Let there be n ≥ 3 banks who extend credit to each other in a DNS payments
system.7 The amount of credit extended by bank i is denoted qi ≥ 0, i ∈ N :=
{1, ..., n}; note that this consists of a number of gross credits extended by a
bank when it accepts to perform a payment to one of its own clients from some
other bank’s client before the payment has been settled between the banks.
Let qij denote the amount of credit extended by bank i to bank j. I assume for
simplicity that a bank extends equal amounts of credit to the other banks, so
that:
qij = 11 − nqi, i, j ∈ N, i = j.
In line with practice in most countries, there is no charge on an intra-day
loan. The income received by a bank comes from fees paid by the payment-
demanding public. The demand for intra-day credit is thus derived from the
7With n = 2, there would be no externalities involved; see the discussion below.
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underlying demand for intra-day payment services. In particular, it is assumed
to be given by the following linear inverse demand function:
p = p(Q) = a − b Q,
where Q := ∑i∈N qi is the total quantity of credit supplied, and a, b > 0.
Note that p is not the interbank credit rate but the marginal willingness to
pay among consumers of payment services. It seems reasonable to allow the
demand for payment services to depend on the functioning of the interbank
market.8
I consider all interday, or long-term, credit as exogenous to the current
problem; to ease notation, I normalize long-term credit at zero.
The technological costs to a bank of extending an amount q of credit is given
by c2 q
2, where c > 0. In addition, there are costs associated with the risk of the
intra-day credit that is extended. I assume that banks are risk neutral and that
the expected loss per unit of credit is increasing in the amount extended: d2 q.
This implies that a bank’s total internal direct credit risk is d2 q
2, where d > 0.
In our partial-equilibrium framework, welfare is the sum of consumer and
producer surpluses, account taken of the externalities. There are two kinds of
externalities.9 First, there is the external direct credit risk: Each dollar lent by
a bank to another bank is a cost not only to the lender, but to any third bank as
well. In particular, for each unit of credit extended to bank k by other banks,
there is a credit risk imposed on bank j equal to d2 q j. Thus, the external direct
credit risk that bank i imposes on bank j by extending credit to bank k equals
d
2
qikq j = d2
1
1 − nqiq j.
For each third bank j, there are (n − 2) banks k through which this externality




n − 1qiq j,
8The assumption that p depends on Q, or, vice versa, that demanded payment quantity depends
on the price charged for payments, contrasts with that of Berger et al. (1996), who base their
discussion of the risk-cost trade-off in payment systems on the quantity of payment being fixed.
It is, however, consistent with the empirical evidence that is available for the price sensitivity of
small-value payments (Humphrey et al. 1996, 2001). There do not seem to exist any similar studies
on large-value payments. However, there is no reason to believe results would be much different.
Linearity is assumed here for simplicity. While there is no reason to believe payment demand is
price sensitive for very low prices, linearity and a finite b may be a good local approximation when
firms have market power as they have here.
9My way of modelling the externalities follows that of Gelfand and Lindsey (1989). They do not
consider the case of oligopoly, though. In addition, they do not take into account that externalities
are suffered by third banks only; see below.
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Similarly, the external credit risk imposed upon bank j by the collective








Secondly, there is the systemic risk, which operates in the same way as the
external direct credit risk.10 In order to simplify, I assume that the strength of
the two externalities is the same, i.e., I use the risk parameter d also for the
systemic risk. This means that the systemic risk caused by the lending activity
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With the specified inverse demand, total gross benefit from a credit quantity

















































For simplicity, I assume that all revenue from performing payment services
accrues to the bank of the client receiving the payment, i.e., to the bank
10As we shall see later, introducing a lender of last resort will imply a distinction between the two
kinds of external risk.
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extending intra-day credit. In calculating its payoff, private bank i takes into
account revenues, technological costs, the internal direct credit risk, and the



























Note from the last term in the above expression that, although the external
credit risk and systemic risk are imposed upon a bank by the activities of other
banks, the extent to which each bank is exposed to these externalities can be
decreased by the bank reducing its own activity in the market.
4 Three different scenarios
Although the activities of the central bank is the ultimate focus of interest in
this analysis, I present three different scenarios of the payments system and
the intra-day credit market. In the first scenario, all the n banks operating in
the payment system are private and thus maximizing profits. This scenario is
of interest in its own right, because the analysis of it highlights the contrast
between the tendency towards undersupply because of oligopoly and the
tendency towards oversupply because of negative externalities.
In the second scenario, one of the banks is made into a publicly owned bank
with the aim of maximizing welfare. Apart from this difference in objective,
this bank is like the other banks; in particular, it is as likely as any other bank
to become illiquid.
The existence of a publicly owned bank is interesting for at least two
reasons. First, the intra-day credit market is very difficult to regulate from
above, particularly in a net-settlement payments system, where there is little
supervision of credit flows during the business day. In such a case, it is
interesting to see if there is anything to gain from “regulating from within”
with the help of a welfare-maximizing participant in the market.
Secondly, there do in fact exist publicly owned banks in many countries:
The central bank is typically publicly owned, but in addition also other parts
of the banking industry may be so. It may be doubtful whether such banks
perform differently from their private counterparts; it may, in fact, be that the
government keeps the public bank for enhancement of fiscal revenue rather
than for welfare maximization. Presently, however, I will argue that using the
public bank as an instrument for regulating the intra-day credit market from
within is an alternative worth considering.
I therefore, in this scenario, perform the following exercise: I transform one
of the private banks of the previous scenario into a publicly owned, welfare-
maximizing one; thus, there are now n − 1 private banks and one public one.
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Apart from the ownership status and the difference in the banks’ objectives
that this entails, the banks are identical.
In the third and final scenario, I take into account that the publicly owned
bank, if it is also the central bank, cannot become illiquid and therefore
imposes less external risks on other banks than a private one does. To be
specific, there is no systemic risk associated with the credit it extends. With









































































where qC is the amount of credit extended by the central bank.
































Again, each private bank’s profit is reduced by the externality imposed on it
by other banks. However, this externality is lower from the lending activity of
the central bank, which imposes external credit risk only.
I suggest that the homogeneous-good model of Section 3 is applicable also
in this scenario, even though the banks involved now are heterogeneous. The
banks differ only with respect to their systemic-risk properties. It is unlikely
that consumers of payment services are concerned about the systemic risk
associated with a particular bank’s credit activity. Thus, from the viewpoint
of the consumers, these banks provide homogeneous payment services.
5 Social optimum
In a discussion of the social optimum, there are only two different cases to
consider. When it comes to efficiency, the banks’ objectives are irrelevant.
Thus, I need only distinguish between the case with ordinary banks only and
the case with a central bank present. In the latter case, not surprisingly, the
central bank with its more benign externality property performs the leading
role: The effect of the central bank not causing any systemic risk is that this
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bank should provide a larger portion of total credit than any private bank.
Recall that the qs measure gross credit extended. Thus, it is not possible for
any bank to supply a negative amount, i.e., to turn itself into a borrower
in gross terms. When the risk externalities are sufficiently large relative to
technological costs, the social optimum, therefore, calls for the central bank to
be the only bank active in the payments system. Details of the social optimum
are provided in Proposition A1 in the Appendix. We can, however, extract
some essential properties of this optimum:11
Proposition 1
(i) If
n ≥ 4, and d
c
≤ 2,






3n − 8 ,
then each of the (n − 1) private banks extends less credit in social optimum
if the public bank is a central bank than if it is an ordinary bank.
Thus, unless externalities are very high, there is room for private banks
in social optimum. But they will extend less credit when the central bank is
present, particularly when n is high. It is worth emphasizing that dc ≤ 2 is a
sufficient condition, and by no means a necessary one, for private banks to be
present in optimum.
6 Equilibrium analysis
In the analysis of equilibrium, both externality properties and objectives
matter. Thus, I need to distinguish between all three of the scenarios outlined
in Section 4.
Private banks only The case when all the banks operating in the interbank
market are private highlights some essential features of an intra-day credit
market.12
11Part (i) of Proposition 1 follows directly from Proposition A1 in the Appendix, since d1, which is
used in that Proposition to delineate cases where private banks are inactive in social optimum, is
shown always to be greater than 2c. Part (ii) follows from a comparison of the expressions in parts
(i) and (ii) of Proposition A1.
12The equilibrium in the case of private banks only is described in detail in Proposition A2 in the
Appendix. The present result follows from a comparison of Propositions A1 and A2.
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Proposition 2 When n ≥ 4 identical private banks extend credit on the intra-
day credit market, credit is oversupplied in equilibrium, relative to the social





n − 2 .
There are two contrasting forces at play producing this result. First, there
is the effect of imperfect competition, leading in isolation to an undersupply
of credit. Second, there is the effect of risk externalities (external direct risk
and systemic risk, combined), leading in isolation to an oversupply of credit:
Although each bank does take into account how it can reduce the effect
of other banks’ externalities on its own profit, it does not account for the
externalities it itself imposes on the other banks. An increase in n, the number
of banks, decreases the downward distortion caused by imperfect competition
and increases the upward one caused by the risk externalities. An increase
in d increases the distortion due to risk externalities.13 Thus, even if there
is imperfect competition in the payments market, there is not necessarily an
undersupply of credit in this market, due to the risk externalities involved.
The demand for payment services is viewed by many as being rather
inelastic, implying in our model that b is large. We see from Proposition 2 that,
the higher is b , the less is the scope for oversupply of credit in equilibrium
when all banks are private.
Introducing a public bank The next scenario has a publicly owned, welfare-
maximizing bank pitted against (n − 1) private ones; thus, the number of banks
is kept unaltered relative to the previous analysis. Apart from the ownership
status and the difference in the banks’ objectives that this entails, the banks
are (still) identical.
In cases where private banks, if left alone, would oversupply credit, it
becomes relevant for the public firm to reduce total credit supply by supplying
less credit than a private bank would. This happens, as we see in Proposition 3
below, when the risk externalities are sufficiently severe. The restriction d < c
is imposed here to ensure equilibrium stability in the sense of Dixit (1986); see
the discussion after Proposition 4 below. 14
13As indicated in the Introduction, the observation that a monopoly or an oligopoly with negative
externalities may overproduce relative to the social optimum is well known from other contexts,
such as pollution. Häckner and Nyberg (1996), like I do, discuss an oligopoly with negative
externalities between firms. In their model, however, the negative externality works through the
demand side, while here, it works through costs.
14Parts (i) and (iii) of Proposition 3 follow straightforwardly from Proposition A3 in the Appendix.
A proof of part (ii), as well as an exact delineation of cases of oversupply of credit, are found in
the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 Assume d < c.
(i) The public bank is active in equilibrium if and only if, in addition,
d
b + c <
n − 1
n(n − 2) .
(ii) There is oversupply of credit in equilibrium if the public bank is inactive
and also in some cases where it is active.
(iii) The public bank extends a larger amount of credit in equilibrium than a





n − 1 .
When the public bank is also the central bank I turn, finally, to the case where
the public bank not only is a welfare-maximizer but also is the central bank and
as such is not able to become illiquid.15 While this creates an asymmetry among
the banks, with the central bank exerting less externalities on other banks than
any of the private banks does, the central bank may still suffer from a lack of
instruments in this case: If risk externalities are high and a reduction in credit
is called for, the central bank may end up with a lower activity level than its
private counterpart, despite its superior externality properties. In particular, I
have:
Proposition 4
(i) The central bank is active in equilibrium if and only if
d
b + c <
2(n − 1)
n(n − 3) .
(ii) There may be oversupply of credit in equilibrium even when the central
bank is active, and there may undersupply of credit even when the central
bank is inactive.
(iii) In equilibrium, the central bank extends a smaller amount of credit than a





n(n − 2) .
Note in Proposition 4 that, contrary to the previous case, when the public
bank is a central bank, the equilibrium is always stable. The reason is that
equilibrium non-stability is related to conflicts of interests among the firms
in the market. This conflict is most striking in the previous case of one bank
15Accounts from history indicate that central banking may be profitable in some circumstances;
see, e.g., the discussion in Rolnick et al. (1998, 2000). Thus, a discussion of a profit-maximizing,
rather than welfare-maximizing central bank, with all of such a bank’s benign risk externalities,
may be of interest, even though it is skipped in the present exposition.
224 T. Nilssen
being welfare-maximizing but otherwise identical to the other banks. In the
present case of the welfare-maximizing bank, in addition, exerting less risk
externalities from its lending activities than the other banks do, the conflict
is reduced, since also the private banks benefit in part from the central bank
having a large share of the market.
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 1(ii), we see how differently an
increase in the risk-externality parameter d affects the first-best optimum and
the mixed-oligopoly equilibrium. In optimum, an increase in the systemic risk
implies the central bank taking on a larger share of the market. In equilibrium,
instead, the central bank has to reduce its activities in order to correct for
the oversupply from the private banks. In fact, in the extreme case, the first
best calls for the central bank to be the only bank in the market, while in
equilibrium, the central bank is, quite to the contrary, the only bank that is
inactive.16 As part (ii) of the Proposition witnesses, the central bank chooses
to be inactive even in some cases when the resulting equilibrium outcome
features an undersupply of credit relative to the social optimum.
Part (iii) of Proposition 4 addresses the question asked earlier, in the
presentation of the risk externalities in Section 2: Will the central bank extend
more or less credit than the private banks? It has incentives to extend more
credit because its credit activities constitute less social risk than that of the
others, and because of the traditional oligopoly undersupply effect. The former
of these is strong when there are many private banks, while the latter is strong
when there are few of them. But it also has incentives to extend less credit in
order to correct for the risk externalities emanating from the private banks’
credit activities. When the risk is large enough, this latter effect will surely
dominate and the central bank, despite its lower externalities, ends up with
a lower activity level than the others. An ordinary public bank, on the other
hand, is less likely to end up with a higher quantity than the private banks,
since it does not have an externality advantage over them as the central bank
does. By comparing expressions in Propositions 3 and 4, I find:17
Proposition 5 Suppose d < c.
(i) If, in addition,
1





n(n − 2) ,
then, in equilibrium, the public bank is larger than the private banks when
it is also the central bank, but smaller than them when it is an ordinary
bank.
16The exact condition for this extreme case to occur is given in Eq. 3 in the Appendix.
17The restriction d < c, although not applied in Proposition 4, is made here in order to compare the
results there with those of Proposition 3, where this restriction is imposed to ensure equilibrium
stability.
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(ii) If, in addition,
n − 1
n(n − 2) <
d
b + c <
2(n − 1)
n(n − 3) ,
then the publicly owned bank is active in equilibrium if it is also a central
bank but not if it is an ordinary bank.
Proposition 5 indicates that a central bank has a larger role to play than an
ordinary, publicly owned bank has, not only in the first-best optimum, but also
in the second-best equilibrium: In general, a central bank extends more credit
than an ordinary public bank. And more particularly, there are cases where
an ordinary public bank would choose not to operate in order to counteract
an oversupply by the private banks, but where the beneficial externality
properties of a central bank would make room for its active participation. This
difference comes about partly because there are less overall externalities when
one of the banks is a central bank, which calls for increased total credit, and
partly because the central bank’s credit is particularly beneficial for welfare.
The change in private banks’ behavior as we move from a regime with an
ordinary public bank to one with a central bank is caused by the banks’
quantities being strategic substitutes, in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985): If
the public bank expands its output, then the private banks contract theirs, and
vice versa.
However, the way the private banks and the public bank react to an
increase differs between the two cases of an ordinary public bank and a central
bank. Because the introduction of the central bank into the market reduces
the systemic risk, the private banks react to an increase in risk in a much
more aggressive way than in the case when the public bank share their risk
properties. Actually, this amounts to an overreaction on the part of the private
banks. Alternatively, compared to its private counterparts, the central bank,
with its benign risk externalities, chooses to hold on to its extension of credit,
as the risk increases, to a much larger extent than if it were an ordinary bank.
The decrease in externalities caused by the introduction of the central bank
is asymmetric, which calls for a decrease in private banks’ credit in social
optimum, a decrease which is too hard to implement for a central bank with
only one instrument, as in my model, viz. its own credit activity. The outcome
is that, even though the case of a central bank has less risk externalities overall
and therefore the social optimum calls for a higher level of total credit than in
the case of an ordinary public bank, an oversupply of equilibrium credit may
occur with the central bank, even in cases where, with an ordinary public bank,
there would be an undersupply of credit in equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper, contrary to most of the existing literature on the payments system,
suggests that considering a large-value payment system as an interbank credit
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oligopoly is a worthwhile exercise and presents an analysis of strategic interac-
tion in such a market. Particular emphasis is put on how a central bank, with
more benign objectives and externalities than other banks, performs in the
equilibrium of such an oligopoly. Thus, the analysis may also, more generally,
have a bearing on the understanding of the performance of publicly owned
firms in this kind of mixed oligopolies: The present analysis shows how the
market equilibrium is affected by introducing a public firm that is not only a
welfare maximizer but whose production carries a lower social cost than that
of the private firms in the market.
An analysis of the payments system limited in scope to the social optimum
would conclude that the central bank ought to engage heavily as a regular
participant in the interbank credit market. The present analysis shows the
importance of performing an equilibrium analysis as well: For sufficiently high
risk externalities and an inability, on the part of the central bank, to instruct
each private bank its extension of credit, the correct thing for the central bank
to do is to stay out and stick to the role as supervisor and coordinator.
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Appendix
This Appendix contains detailed results, and their proofs, of the analysis of this
model.
Proposition A1 Social optimum
(i) With identical banks in the intra-day market, the social optimum is that
each of the n banks supplies:
q∗P =
a
bn + c + d(2n − 3) .




C denote the socially optimum amount of credit of fered
by the central bank, a private bank, and in total, respectively, in the case
with (n − 1) private banks and one central bank. Def ine:
D∗C := d
[
8b + n2(8c − d)] + 4 (n − 1) [c(bn + c) − 2d(3c − d)] .
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τ + √τ 2 + c(bn + c)(n − 1)(n2 − 8n + 8)
]
n2 − 8n + 8 , if n ≥ 7,
2c(n − 1)
n − 4 , if 5 ≤ n ≤ 6.
where τ := 2[b + c(n2 − 3n + 3)].















cn(n − 1) + 2d] ;
(b) if n = 3, or if n ≥ 5 and d ≥ d1, then private banks do not extend
credit in social optimum, i.e.,
q∗Cp = 0, and
q∗Cc = Q∗C =
a
b + c + d .
Proof
(i) From the welfare expression in Section 3, I get the first-order condition
for bank i’s optimum amount of credit:
dW
dqi




















By symmetry, qi = q = Qn , for each i. Thus, the above equation reduces
to:
a − bnq − cq − d(2n − 3) = 0,
from which I obtain the expression for q∗P.
(ii) The relevant welfare expression in this case is WC in Section 4. Because
of the symmetry of the private banks, the first-order condition for a social
optimum with respect to the central bank’s credit quantity is:
a − b [qc + (n − 1)qp
] − cqc − dqc − d(n − 2)qp − d2 (n − 2)qp, (1)
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while the first-order condition with respect to each private bank’s quan-
tity is:
a − b [qc + (n − 1)qp
] − cqp − dqp − dn − 2n − 1
[






Supposing an interior solution, I can now solve the following system of





(b + c + d)
[





b + 3(n − 2)
2(n − 1)d
) [
b(n − 1) + c + 2n
2 − 7n + 7
















where the first (second) equation is the first-order condition with respect
to the quantity of the central bank, qCc (the quantity of a private bank,
qCp). The solution is the one outlined in part (ii)(a) of the Proposition.
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is D∗C, given in the Proposition.
Second-order conditions for an optimum require that D∗C > 0, which




τ + √τ 2 + c(bn + c)(n − 1)(n2 − 8n + 8)
]
n2 − 8n + 8 , (2)
where τ is defined in Proposition A1. In addition, an interior solution
requires that quantities be non-negative, in particular that
2c(n − 1) − d(n − 4) ≥ 0.
This is never satisfied for n = 3 and always satisfied for n = 4. For n ≥ 7,
this condition is weaker than Eq. 2. Thus, we get the condition stated in
the Proposition.
When D∗C ≤ 0, which can only occur if n ≥ 7, optimum is one of two
possible corner solutions: either the central bank alone and qCp = 0;
or (n − 1) private banks and qCc = 0. Comparing the welfare levels
obtainable in each of these two cases, the former case is found to be
preferred to the latter if d ≥ c(n − 2)/(n − 4), a condition which is implied
by D∗C ≤ 0. Thus, when the solution is not interior, social optimum is the
central bank alone.
Finally, note that, clearly, d1 > 2c if the right-hand side of Eq. 2 is. This








Thus, d1 > 2c. unionsq
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Proposition A2 (Equilibrium with private banks only) If n identical private




b(n + 1) + c + d(n − 1) .
























Again, by symmetry, all qs are the same and equal to Qn . Thus, I write the
first-order condition as:
a − b(n + 1)q − cq − d(n − 1) = 0,
and I obtain the expression for qeP in the Proposition. unionsq
Proposition A3 (Introducing a public bank) Assume d < c. Let qeOo, q
e
Op, and
QeO denote the equilibrium amount of credit of fered by the public bank, a
private bank, and in total, respectively, in the case of (n − 1) identical private
banks and one publicly owned, welfare-maximizing bank. Def ine:














c(n − 1) + d] ,





(b + c)(n − 1) − dn(n − 2)] ,





(b + c)(n − 1) + (c − d)(n − 1)2 + dn] .
(b) If
(b + c)(n − 1)
n(n − 2) ≤ d ≤ c,
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then, in equilibrium, each private bank lends
qeOp =
a
bn + c + d(n − 2) ,
the public bank is inactive,
qeOo = 0,
and total credit supply equals
QeO =
a(n − 1)
bn + c + d(n − 2) .
Proof
(a) Each private bank maximizes its payoff with respect to own credit,
while the public bank maximizes welfare with respect to its credit. Thus,
following the proof of Proposition A1(i), and since the (n − 1) private
banks are symmetric, I can write the welfare-maximizing public bank’s
first-order condition as:
a − b [(n − 1)qp + qo] − cqo − dqo − 2d(n − 2)qp = 0
Similarly, I can write each private bank’s first-order condition as:
a − b [(n − 1)qp + qo
] − bqp − cqp − dqp − dn − 2n − 1
[
(n − 2)qp + qo
] = 0




bn + c + d(n−2)2n−1
)











where the first (second) equation is the first-order condition of a private
(the public) bank. Equilibrium stability requires DO > 0 (see Dixit 1986),
which is met here under the maintained assumption d < c. The solution
to the equation system is given in the Proposition, and it holds if all the
qs are non-negative; the condition for this is the one given. The quantity
of total credit equals qeOo + (n − 1)qeOp.
(b) The optimum amount of credit for the public bank is now zero. Taking
this into account in the first-order condition of a private bank, the
expression in the Proposition is obtained. The quantity of total credit
equals (n − 1)qeOp. unionsq
Proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3 First, I check the case of part (b) of Propo-
sition A3, supposing
d
b + c ≥
n − 1
n(n − 2) .
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Comparing (n − 1)qeOp from Proposition A3 with nq∗P from Proposition A1, I
find that there is oversupply if the weaker condition
d ≥ bn + c
n2 − 3n + 3
holds; the latter condition is weaker because, in the two righthand-side expres-
sions, the denominator of the latter is less than or equal to that of the former
and its numerator is greater. Thus, there is always oversupply when the public
bank is inactive.








I compare QeOo from Proposition A3 with nq
∗
P from Proposition A1 and find
that there is oversupply for n ≥ 4 if and only if d > d2, where
d2 := 12
(
c (n − 1)









c (n − 1)






n2 + 4n + 1)
(n − 1)2 (n − 3) ,
is the lower root solving the equation QeOo = nq∗P with respect to d, provided
the equation has real roots; the higher root does not satisfy the above restric-
tion. When n = 3, there is always oversupply in equilibrium. unionsq





denote the equilibrium amount of credit of fered by the central bank, a private
bank, and in total, respectively, in the case with (n − 1) private banks and one
central bank. Def ine:
DeC := 4(n − 1)[b 2 + c2 + bc(n + 1) + cd(n − 1)] + d[4b(2n − 1) + 4c + dn2].
(a) If
d
b + c <
2(n − 1)
n(n − 3) ,





2c(n − 1) + dn] ,





2(b + c)(n − 1) − dn(n − 3)] ,









b + c ≥
2(n − 1)
n(n − 3)
then, in equilibrium, the central bank is inactive and the outcome is the
same as the one reported in Proposition A3(b).
Proof The central bank’s first-order condition in part (a) is identical to Eq. 1
above. From a private bank’s profit in the case of a central bank, πCi in
Section 4, each private bank’s first-order condition is, by symmetry among the
private banks, given by:
a − b [(n − 1)qp + qc
] − bqp − cqp − dqp − d (n − 2)
2




n − 1qc = 0.
Supposing non-negative quantities in equilibrium, the equilibrium is thus





(b + c + d)
[





b + n − 2
2(n − 1)d
) (
bn + c + n
2 − 3n + 3
















where the first (second) equation is the first-order condition of the central
bank, qCc (a private bank, qCp). The resulting outcome is the one outlined.
Quantities are non-negative if the numerator of qeCc is, which gives rise to the
condition distinguishing parts (a) and (b). unionsq
Proof of part (ii) of Proposition 4 Consider first the case where the central
bank is active in equilibrium. Given the supposition that the equilibrium
outcome is interior, I first compare the total equilibrium supply of part (a) of
Proposition A4 with the optimum total supply in Proposition A1(ii)(a), which
covers the subcase where the social optimum is interior, too. This comparison
shows that there is oversupply in this subcase if and only if
[√
α2 + 8bcn(n − 2) − α
] n − 1
2n(n − 2) < d <
2c(n − 1)
n − 4 ,
where α := b(n − 4) + 2c(n − 1)(n − 2). The second inequality is always sat-
isfied when the social optimum is interior, by Proposition A1(ii). Secondly, I
compare the total equilibrium supply of part (a) of Proposition A4 with the
optimum supply in Proposition A1(ii)(b), for the subcase when the optimum
is for the central bank to be alone. This comparison shows that there is




2 (n − 1)
n − 4 .
Combining the two subcases, we find that the former condition holds in both.
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Consider next the case where the central bank is inactive in equilibrium.
In order to show that there may be undersupply in equilibrium it suffices to









when optimum calls for the central bank to be the only bank in the market,
while in equilibrium the central bank is, quite to the contrary, the only bank
that is inactive. The comparison between equilibrium supply and optimum
reveals that there is undersupply if, in addition to Eq. 3, also the following
holds:
d > b − c (n − 2) .
Comparing this condition with Eq. 3 reveals that it is not vacuous and that
indeed cases exist where the central bank is inactive in equilibrium and still
there is undersupply of credit. unionsq
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